In this paper, we study a class of stochastic time-inconsistent linear-quadratic (LQ) control problems with control input constraints. These problems are investigated within the more general framework associated with random coefficients. This paper aims to further develop a new methodology, which fundamentally differs from those in the standard control (without constraints) theory in the literature, to cope with the mathematical difficulties raised due to the presence of input constraints.
Introduction
In dynamic decision making, the presence of time inconsistency is often identified in socioeconomic systems and accordingly, its study has important values in various fields, such as engineering, management science, finance and economics (for example, see Kydland and Prescott [16] ). More recently, considerable research attention has been paid in studying this family of stochastic time-inconsistent control problems as well as their financial applications. The study on time-inconsistency by economists can be traced back to Strotz [20] in the 1950s, who initiated the formulation of time-inconsistent decision making as a game between incarnations of the decision maker himself. For the sake of motivation and to make our discussion concrete, let us briefly lay out a simple but illustrating example of time inconsistency in dynamic setting. 
where X · ∈ R, u · ∈ R 2 , θ = (1, 1) ′ and W · is a two-dimensional standard Weiner process. Its dynamic counterpart yields the following optimization problem over [t, T ], for any t ∈ [0, T ],
However, applying results obtained in [10, 12, 17, 18] , we have an optimal control u * ,0,x 0 s + λe 2T )θ, 0 ≤ s ≤ T for Problem (1.1), where It is obvious that u * ,t,X * ,0,x 0 t s = u * ,0,x 0 s for t ≤ s ≤ T . The dynamic optimization problem (1.2) is called time-inconsistent since (1.3) fails to hold. Therefore, time inconsistency reflects that an optimal strategy at present may no longer be optimal in the future.
In response, Strotz suggested two possible fundamental schemes to circumvent time inconsistency: (i) "He may try to precommit his future activities either irrevocably or by contriving a penalty for his future self if he should misbehave", which is named the strategy of pre-commitment; and (ii) "He may resign himself to the fact of intertemporal conflict and decide that his 'optimal' plan at any date is a will-o'-the-wisp which cannot be attained, and learn to select the present action which will be best in the light of future disobedience", which is termed the strategy of consistent planning. The strategy of consistent planning is also called the time-consistent policy in the literature. For a dynamic mean-variance model, Basak and Chabakauri [1] reformulated it as an intrapersonal game model where the investor optimally elicits the policy at any time t, on the premise that he has already decided time-consistent (equilibrium) policies applied in the future.
The game formulation is tractable to capture time inconsistency when the underlying time setting is (finite or countable) discrete. Nevertheless, when the time setting is continuous, the formulation should be generalized or modified in different ways. Additionally, some tailor-made arguments, to be shown later, should also be introduced to handle the continuous-time setting. We remark that it is still unclear which is the best one among different definitions of a solution to time-inconsistent decision problem. Mathematically, both the existence and the uniqueness of a solution make a definition more acceptable. Although it is common that a game problem admits multiple solutions, the time-inconsistent decision problem is a decision problem for single player, and hence, an identical value process for all solutions is considered to be more reasonable even if the control may allow multiple solutions. Instead of seeking an "optimal control", some kind of equilibrium controls are worthy to be developed in both theoretical methodology and numerical computation algorithm. This is mainly motivated by practical applications in statistical economics and has recently attracted considerable interest and attempts.
Yong [21] and Ekeland and Pirvu [8] established the existence of equilibrium solutions, with their own definitions for equilibrium solutions, for the time inconsistency caused by hyperbolic discounting. Grenadier and Wang [9] also studied the hyperbolic discounting problem in an optimal stopping model. In a Markovian system, Björk and Murgoci [4] proposed a definition of a general stochastic control problem with time-inconsistent terms, and presented some sufficient condition for a control to be a solution by a system of partial differential equations. They constructed some solutions for some examples including an LQ one, but it looks very hard to find not-too-harsh condition on parameters to ensure the existence of a solution. Björk, Murgoci and Zhou [5] also derived an equilibrium for a meanvariance portfolio selection with state-dependent risk aversion. Basak and Chabakauri
[1] studied an equilibrium strategy for a mean-variance portfolio selection problem with constant risk aversion and got more details on the constructed solution. Hu, Jin and Zhou in [10] generalized the discrete-time game formulation for an LQ control problem with time-inconsistent terms in a non-Markovian system, which is slightly different from the one in Björk and Murgoci [4] , and constructed an equilibrium strategy for quite general LQ control problem, including a non-Markovian system, and then in [11] , they proved that the constructed equilibrium strategy is unique. Bensoussan, Frehse and Yam [2] introduced a class of time-inconsistent game problems of mean-field type and provided their equilibrium solutions; Karnam, Ma and Zhang [13] introduced the idea of "dynamic utility" under which the original time-inconsistent problem (under the fixed utility) is transferred to time-consistent one. In addition, Cui, Li, Wang and Zhu [6] showed that the multi-period mean-variance problem does not satisfy time consistency in efficiency and developed a revised mean-variance strategy. By relaxing the self-financing restriction to allow the withdrawal of money from the market, the revised mean-variance strategy dominates the original dynamic mean-variance strategy in the mean-variance space. Furthermore, Cui,
Li, Li and Shi [7] further investigated the time-consistent strategy for a behavioral risk aversion model by solving a nested mean-variance game formulation. Yung [3] for the deterministic coefficients. Our current work is one further step toward understanding the role of input constraint in time-inconsistency decision making, and we expect to see more research progress along this direction.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give the formulation of the LQ control problem without time consistency under constraint. Then we give an equivalent characterization of a solution by a system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations in Section 3. Finally in Section 4, we give an explicit solution to equilibrium for mean-variance portfolio selection under convex cone constraint and show that the thus constructed solution is unique.
Problem Formulation
Let (W t ) 0≤t≤T = (W We will use the following notation. Let p ≥ 1.
We will often use vectors and matrices in this paper, where all vectors are column 
where A is a bounded deterministic function on
respectively, and b and
the corresponding state process with initial value x 0 ∈ R n and with u ∈ L p F (0, T ; K). When time evolves to t ∈ [0, T ], we need to consider the controlled system starting from t and state
At time t with the system state X t = x t , our aim is to minimize
In the above Q and R are both positive semi-definite and essentially bounded adapted processes on [0, T ] with values in S n and S l respectively, G, h, µ 1 , µ 2 are constants in S n , S n , R n×n , R n respectively, and moreover G is positive semi-definite.
We define an equilibrium (control) in the following manner. Given a control u * , for any 
Remark 2.2 There is some difference between our definition and that of [10] , because there is a control constraint K in our situation. Note that the convexity of K is not needed in our definition.
Necessary and Sufficient Condition of Equilibrium Controls
In this section, we present a general necessary and sufficient condition for equilibria. This condition is made possible by a stochastic Lebesgue differentiation theorem involving conditional expectation.
To proceed, we start with some relevant known result from [10] . Let u * be a fixed control and X * be the corresponding state process. For any t ∈ [0, T ), define in the time
Notice that neither the terminal condition nor the coefficients of this equation depend on t; so it can be taken as a BSDE on the entire time interval [0, T ]. Denote its solution as
It then follows from the uniqueness of the solution to BSDE that
The following estimate under local spike variation is reproduced from [10, Proposition
where Λ(s; t)
In view of Proposition 3.1 and the fact that H(s) 0, it is straightforward to get the following sufficient condition of an equilibrium.
The necessary condition is somewhat different.
Hence, lim inf
Q.E.D.
The next result provides a key property for the solution to BSDE (3.1), and represents the process Λ(s; t) in a special form. 
Proof: Define the function ψ(·) as the unique continuous solution to the following matrixvalued ordinary differential equation (ODE)
where I n denotes the n × n identity matrix. It is clear that ψ(·) is invertible, and both ψ(·) and ψ(·) −1 are bounded. Next, from the definition ofp(s; t),
where
We now set out to derive our general necessary and sufficient condition for equilibrium controls. Although (3.4) and (3.5) already provide characterizing conditions, they are nevertheless not very useful because they involve a limit. It is tempting to expect that the limit therein is Λ(t; t), in the spirit of the Lebesgue differentiation theorem. However, one needs to be very careful, since in both (3.4) and (3.5), the conditional expectation with respect to F t is involved. The following lemma generalizes Lemma 3.4 in [11] from q = 2 to any q > 1, and we provide a complete proof here for the sake of self-containedness.
(Ω; R + ) (q * is the conjugate of q) is a separable space, it follows from the (deterministic) Lebesgue differentiation theorem that there is a countable dense subset
(Ω; R + ), such that for almost all t, we have
and lim
We have the following estimates:
where the last inequality is due to Doob's martingale inequality as η s is an L q * -integrable martingale. Hence for any η ∈ D,
Since (recall that q * is the conjugate of q)
, there exists a constant δ t > 0, such that
This implies that
ds is uniformly integrable in ε ∈ (0, δ t ). Since η is essentially bounded, so is η t ; hence by Fatou's lemma, for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], and any η ∈ D,
which implies
, let X * be the corresponding state process Proof: Recall that we have the representation Λ(s; t) = λ 1 (s) + λ 2 (s)ξ t . Then Now we suppose that u * is an equilibrium, then from (3.5) and (3.10), lim inf
Then, from Lemma 3.5, for any θ ∈ (0, 1],
Sending θ → 0 + , we obtain (3.9).
When n = 1, the state process X is a scalar-valued process evolving by the dynamics 
In this case, the two adjoint equations for the equilibrium become 
admits a solution (X * , p, k);
· satisfies the condition (3.9).
Mean-Variance Equilibrium Strategies in a Market under Convex Cone Constraint
As an application of the time-inconsistent LQ theory, we consider the continuous-time
Markowitz mean-variance portfolio selection model in a market under convex cone constraint with random model coefficients. We aim to establish the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium strategy. The model is mathematically a special case of the general LQ problem formulated earlier in this paper, with n = 1 naturally.
We use the classical setup. The wealth equation is governed by the SDE (4.1)
where r is the (bounded) deterministic interest rate function, and θ is the essentially bounded stochastic risk premium process. In particular, x 0 > 0.
The objective at time t with state X t = x t is to minimize
There are two sources of time-inconsistency in this model, one from the variance term and the other from the state-dependent tradeoff between the mean and the variance. We suppose that the portfolio constraint K is a convex cone here.
The FBSDE (2.1) and (3.1) specializes to
and the process Λ(s; t) in condition (3.9) is Λ(s; t) = p(s; t)θ s + k(s; t).
We require that
Existence
In this subsection, we construct a solution to (4.3) and (4.4).
Let us first assume the following Ansatz:
and
and then
and p(t; t) = −ρ t µ 1 X * Then (4.4) becomes
We will construct a solution with X * t ≥ 0, thus
and coming back to (4.3), we get:
To proceed, let us recall some facts about bounded-mean-oscillation (BMO) martingales; see Kazamaki [14] . The process 
for any stopping time τ ≤ T . Moreover, if Z · W and V · W are both BMO martingales, then under the probability measure Q defined by
V s ds is a standard Brownian motion, and Z · W Q is a BMO martingale.
Lemma 4.1 The following quadratic BSDE
Proof: We can prove the existence by a truncation argument together with a Girsanov transformation.
Let c > 0 be a given number to be chosen later. Consider the following quadratic BSDE:
This BSDE is a standard quadratic BSDE. Hence there exists a solution (
, and U c · W is a BMO martingale; see [15] and [19] .
We can rewrite the above BSDE as, by noticing that θ
K is a convex cone,
It is easy to see that |β| ≤ C(1 + |U c |), hence β · W is a BMO martingale.
As β · W is a BMO martingale, there exists a new probability measure Q such that
Hence,
from which we deduce that there exists a constant η > 0 independent of c such that M ≥ η.
Taking c = η, we obtain a solution.
Q.E.D.
Now we can state our main existence theorem:
The following feedback
is an equilibrium strategy.
Then, X * s > 0, and
Let us now prove that u * is in
As K is a convex cone,
from which we deduce that
From John-Nirenberg's inequality (see Kazamaki [14 
Moreover, as (2α
As M ≥ c > 0, we deduce that sup
Now we calculate dp. Applying Ito's formula to M s X * s , we obtain
and then dp(s;
Hence (X * , u * , p, k) is a solution to (4.3), and (4.4) is easily checked.
Q.E.D.
Uniqueness Theorem 4.3 The following feedback
is the unique equilibrium strategy.
Proof: Suppose that (X, u, p, k) is a solution to (4.8)
We require that (4.9) Λ(t; t), v t − u t ≥ 0.
There exist two adapted processes α + and α + with 0 ≤ α + ≤ 1, −1 ≤ α − ≤ 0 and
Consider the following quadratic BSDE: (4.10)
We note that
Applying the same method as that of Lemma 4.1, the quadratic BSDE (4.10) admits a
Moreover,Ũ · W is a BMO martingale. Let us take any such solution (M,Ũ ).
It is important to note that
and then condition (4.9) becomes: for any v t ∈ K,
from which we deduce that there exists one bounded adapted process A, such that
t Proj K −p(t; t)θ t −k(t) + (ρ t µ 1 θ t −Ũ t )X t ) =M −1 t A t −p(t; t)θ t −k(t) +M −1
t Proj K (ρ t µ 1 θ t −Ũ t )X t =M −1 t A t −p(t; t)θ t −k(t) +α t X t .
After some calculus, we arrive at: Applying the same method as in [11] , we deduce thatp(s; t) = 0 andk(s) = 0. Therefore u t =α t X t , and then X t > 0, α + = 1, α − = 0.
As X t > 0, replacing (M ,Ũ) by (M, U), and using the above procedure again, we deduce then
and we conclude the proof.
Q.E.D.
From the above theorem, we deduce immediately the uniqueness of solution to BSDE (4.5). As X * s > 0, we deduce that,
In this paper, we consider some time-inconsistent LQ control problem under constraint.
We define the equilibrium strategy via spike perturbation of open control and deduce the necessary and sufficient condition by applying the stochastic maximum principle, following the ideas of [10, 11] . LQ control problem with control constraint is useful because of its wide applications in finance and economics. Our necessary and sufficient conditions are general enough to cover many interesting time-inconsistent LQ control problem under various constraint. We also shed light on important application in mean-variance portfolio under convex cone constraint and present its explicit equilibrium. In particular, we can treat the random coefficient case, while the HJB method used by Bensoussan, Wong, Yam and Yung [3] seems not applicable in random coefficient case.
A Appendix.
Precommitted Mean-Variance Portfolio with Cone
Constraint
We consider the precommitted optimal control problem at time t = 0, (A.1) min J(t, x 0 ; u)
From the existing study on precommitted mean-variance problems such as [12, 17, 18] , it follows that, when the parameters r · and θ · are deterministic, we can get the explicit optimal value for the precommitted problem (A.1): Furthermore, the corresponding optimal control can be written as the affine feedback con- 
